We re-investigate the endogenous choice of price (Bertrand) and quantity (Cournot) contract in the presence of a vertically related upstream market for input. We find that choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for downstream firms when the twopart-tariff pricing contract is determined through centralised Nash bargaining. We further show that the level of social welfare is the same regardless of the mode of product market competition (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot).
Introduction
There is a well-established line of research analysing the effects of Bertrand and Cournot competition on profit and social welfare. In a seminal paper, Singh and Vives (1984) show that choosing quantity (price) contract is the dominant strategy for both firms when the goods are substitutes (complements). Furthermore, firms' profits are higher under Cournot competition whereas Bertrand competition yields higher social welfare when the input markets are competitive 1 . However, it is often found that input suppliers and the final goods producers are involved in two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts (Berto Villa-Boas, 2007 and Bonnet and Dubois, 2010) . Alipranti et al. (2014) show that when a monopoly input supplier and two final goods producers determine the two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts through a decentralised generalised Nash bargaining process, the equilibrium profits of the final goods producers and social welfare are higher under Cournot competition.
We, on the other hand, aim to revisit the classic question of price and quantity contract where the downstream firms involve in centralised bargaining 2 with an upstream input supplier to determine the two-part tariff vertical pricing contracts. We show that choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for the downstream firms and both Bertrand and Cournot entail equal welfare level. López and Naylor (2004) 
The model
We consider an economy with two downstream firms, denoted by D i producing differentiated products where ݅, ݆ = 1, 2 and ݅ ≠ ݆ . The downstream firms require a critical input for production that they purchase from a monopoly input supplier, U, through two-part tariff contracts involving an up-front fixed-fee and a per-unit price. U produces the inputs at a constant marginal cost of production, c which we assume to be zero. We assume that one unit of input is required to produce one unit of the output, and ‫ܦ‬ and ‫ܦ‬ can convert the inputs to the final goods without incurring any further cost.
1 See Delbono and Denicolò (1990) , Qiu (1997) and Häckner (2000) for some works on Bertrand and Cournot competition under competitive input markets. 2 The implications of centralised bargaining is justifiable in most continental European countries, such as Germany (Hirsch et al. (2014) ). In the context of strategic input-price determination Calmfors and Driffill (1998) , Danthine and Hunt (1994) argue that collective bargaining is more widely accepted as it internalises various negative externalities, such as unemployment. Also, see Flanagan (2003) , Boeri and Burda (2009) . At stage 3, firms compete contingent to the decisions made in stage 1. We solve the game through backward induction.
Hence, we start our discussion at stage 3. To this extent we consider four possible constellations, ሼߩ = ‫,ݍݍ‬ ‫,‬ ‫,ݍ‬ ‫;‪ሽ‬ݍ‬ that attribute to the following properties:
• ሺߩ = ‫:‪ሻ‬ݍݍ‬ where both firms adopt quantity contracts
• ሺߩ = ‫:‪ሻ‬‬ where both firms adopt price contracts
• ሺߩ = ‫:‪ሻ‬ݍ‬ where D 1 chooses price contract and D 2 chooses quantity contract
• ሺߩ = ‫:‪ሻ‬ݍ‬ where D 1 chooses quantity contract and D 2 chooses price contract.
We work out the equilibrium outcomes under each of these strategy combinations.
At stage 2 U, the monopoly input supplier and a representative of 1 D and 2 D determine the terms of the two-part tariff contract by maximising the following generalised Nash bargaining expression
where ‫ݍ‬ ఘ and ൫ߨ ఘ − ‫ܨ‬ ఘ ൯ denote the output and net profit of the downstream firms and β (resp. (1 ) β − ) shows the bargaining power of the input supplier (resp. final goods producers).
We restrict our analysis to ߚ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ.
Maximising the above with respect to ‫ܨ‬ gives the following
Substituting (2) in (1), we get the maximisation problem as
Eq. (3) shows that the per-unit input price is determined to maximise the industry profit (i.e., the total profits of U, 1 D and 2 D ), since
which is the profit of a monopoly final goods producer, producing both the products at zero marginal cost of production. Hence, it is intuitive that the centralised bargaining entails same level of output, consumer surplus and social welfare irrespective of the mode of the contract (i.e., Bertrand or Cournot) chosen by the final goods producers. 
Equilibrium outcomes
We now find out the equilibrium outcomes under a specific (inverse) demand function: ܲ = 1 − ‫ݍ‬ − ‫ݍߛ‬ , similar to Alipranti et al. (2014) with an exception that we normalise the demand intercept to unity for simplicity. ߛ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ measures the degree of product differentiation. If ߛ = 1, the goods are perfect substitutes, and if ߛ = 0, the goods are isolated.
(q-q) contract

Downstream firm's profit motive yields
Max
Solving the first order conditions we obtain the equilibrium output of the i th firm
Given ( Hence, the profit equations in (14) and (15) 
Results
We now analyse the first stage of the game where the downstream firms decide whether to choose price contract or quantity contract. Table 1 summarises the possible strategies of each firm and the realised profit under the respective scenarios.
Table 1
The closed form solutions of firms' pay-offs under ሼߩ = ‫,ݍݍ‬ ‫,‬ ‫,ݍ‬ ‫‪ሽ‬ݍ‬ are reported in equations (7), (12), (17) and (22) respectively. Straightforward calculations give the following.
The proposition below is immediate from the above.
Proposition 1:
Assume that ߛ ∈ ሺ0,1ሻ, choosing price contract is the dominant strategy for both firms.
The intuition goes as follows. Each final goods producer's profit motive is driven by the amount of input price and upfront fixed fee payable to the upstream agent. First, assume that firm 2 (firm 1) chooses the quantity contract. When ߚ is significantly high, meaning that the input supplier's opportunistic behaviour is more pronounced; firm 1's (firm 2's) output loss following an increase in its own input price is larger under quantity contract than under price contract. Furthermore, the fixed fee being higher under quantity contract 4 ; ‫ܨ‬ ଵ > ‫ܨ‬ ଵ ൫‫ܨ‬ ଶ > ‫ܨ‬ ଶ ൯, firm 1 (firm 2) finds it profitable to choose price contract. Next, if firm 2 (firm 1) chooses a price contract firm 1 (firm 2) again prefers a price contract over a quantity contract as the latter generates a greater loss in its own output level and it involves a higher fixed fee;
. Hence, choosing price contract becomes the dominant strategy for both downstream firms. However, when ߚ is significantly small, the input suppliers offer a lump-sum subsidy to the downstream firms (see footnote 3). The opportunistic behaviour being less significant, in this case, the downstream firms only combat the output reducing effect by choosing price contract (as alluded above).
Conclusion
Allowing a centralised generalised Nash bargaining between the input supplier and the final goods producers, we show the social welfare are the same under Bertrand and Cournot 
